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UNIVERSALISM AND THE GREATER GOOD: 
A RESPONSE TO TALBOTT 
Gordon Knight 
Thomas Talbott has recently argued in this journal that the three proposi-
tions 1) God wills universal salvation 2) God has the power to produce uni-
versal salvation and 3) some persons are not saved are inconsistent. I con-
tend that this claim is only true if God has no overriding purposes that 
would place restrictions on the means God uses to achieve God's ends. One 
possible example of such an overriding purpose would be God's aim to 
produce the most good. I end by suggesting that while God's purpose of 
universal salvation does render the achievement of this end probable, it is 
by no means necessary. 
Thomas Talbott claims that the following propositions are logically 
inconsistent: 
(1) It is God's redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore 
his will) to reconcile all sinners to himself. 
(2) It is within God's power to achieve his redemptive purpose 
for the world. 
(3) Some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will 
therefore either consign them to a place of eternal punishment, 
from which there is no hope of escape, or put them out of exis-
tence altogether.! 
Talbott admits that for these three propositions to be inconsistent, the 
following must be a necessary truth: "If it is God's redemptive purpose 
to reconcile all sinners to himself and it is within his power to accom-
plish that purpose, then he will indeed reconcile all sinners to himself."2 
This, however, does not strike me as a necessary truth. Consider the fol-
lowing analogous proposition: 
If it is Mr. Jones' purpose to become president of the United 
States and it is in Mr. Jones' power to become president of the 
United States, then Mr. Jones will become president of the 
United States. 
Suppose in this instance that Jones is Vice President, and has it in his 
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power to assassinate the President. I do not think that the mere fact that 
Jones has the purpose of becoming president entails that he will assassi-
nate the President in order to do so. This is because the statement "It is 
Mr. Jones' purpose to become President" does not exclude Jones from 
having other purposes which may in some way conflict with the means 
necessary to achieve this end. Similarly, I suggest the statement "It is 
God's redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his will) to rec-
oncile all sinners to himself" does not entail that God could not have an 
overriding purpose that prevents him from using all possible means for 
achieving this end. If God does have an overriding purpose, then while 
God may desire the salvation of all, and while it may be in God's power 
to do so, it may still be that all are not saved. 
Perhaps another example familiar to philosophical theology will 
make this point clearer. Most contemporary theodocies rely in part at 
least on what is called the "free will defense" against the argument from 
evil. Interestingly, the argument from evil against God's existence can 
also be stated in terms of three seemingly inconsistent statements: 
(4) It is God's will to prevent evil from occurring. 
(5) It is in God's power to prevent evil from occurring. 
(6) There is evil in the world. 
The claim is then made that the first two propositions are defining fea-
hues of traditional theism, and that since they are incompatible with the 
existence of evil in the world, we should conclude that the God of tradi-
tional theism does not exist. The standard defense against the argument 
is to point out that some evil might be necessary for some higher pur-
pose. Perhaps God's desire to produce free beings, itself a great good, 
logically requires that God allow for the possibility of these free beings 
producing evil. One might even put the point this way: God aims to cre-
ate as good a world as possible. While evil considered in itself is of 
course not good, there are some great goods (such as the existence of free 
beings) that logically require the possibility of evil. I am not claiming 
here that the free will defence is, by itself, an adequate theodicy. 
However, I would claim that if there is any hope for an adequate solution 
to the problem of evil, the free will defense should at least playa role. 
My argument should now be clear. The three propositions Talbott 
lists are not inconsistent because the logic of desire allows one to desire 
something and yet not desire to do everything that is in one's power to 
achieve that end. But perhaps Talbott would reply that I am misreading 
0) above. Perhaps he means it to be the claim that God has an overrid-
ing desire to save all sinners. By an overriding desire, I mean a desire 
such that no other desire or collection of desires can be capable of over-
riding the means that are necessary to achieve the end in question. So 
we might rephrase 0) as "It is God's redemptive purpose for the world 
to reconcile all sinners to himself at all costs." But this proposition is 
only plausible if it is reasonable to assume that God does not have any 
purpose that could override the goal of universal salvation. What other 
purpose might God have that would outweigh his desire to save souls? 
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Here is one suggestion: 
(7) God desires to produce the most good. 
Indeed it is plausible to suppose that God's desire to reconcile sinners 
does logically follow from this one basic desire. For certainly the salva-
tion of each individual is a great good, and insofar as it is true that God 
desires to produce the most good, God desires to save souls. But the 
desire to produce the most good is a much broader desire than the 
desire to save souls. There may be some things that are very good, the 
desire for which prevents God from using coercive means to save souls. 
The existence of free beings, and the respect for the autonomy of such 
beings, might be candidates for such a good. 
Talbott could here claim in response that God has a way of insuring 
that all are saved compatible with respecting the free will of God's crea-
tures. Perhaps God, by revealing his goodness in full to a creature, will 
be able to insure that the will of that creature be turned to God. Let us 
suppose that he is right here. But all this would show is that God's will 
for this particular good does not conflict with his will for salvation. It 
does not show that there are not any stronger desires that might perform 
this purpose. As long as it is possible for God to have such a higher 
desire however, the three propositions are not inconsistent. 
Furthermore, I think that there may very well be a good that would 
lead God not to reveal his nature. It may be a great good not only that 
human beings have free will, but also that human beings grow spiritual-
ly and morally as result of their own efforts. Indeed this is the insight 
that lies behind the soul making theodicy of John Hick.3 If this is true, 
then God may have a reason never to reveal his nature in such a way 
that salvation is the only option for a given individual. Perhaps the 
possibility of human beings achieving salvation without aid of some 
kind of beatific vision is itself a good that at any given instant overrides 
God's will to save all souls. Recall again the difficulties that surround 
the development of a theodicy for this world. For if God can save all 
souls directly, and there is no great intrinsic good in their coming to God 
via the trials and tribulations of this earthly vale of tears, then God's 
purpose of salvation would seem to entail that the sufferings of this 
earthly life are gratuitous, in which case the argument from evil rises 
like a phoenix with renewed power. 
It is interesting to note however that this line of reasoning only works 
if one accepts certain theological presuppositions. Indeed, if one sup-
poses along with the Augustinian tradition that salvation is ultimately a 
gift that is given by God, then it seems to me that the argument against 
universalism that I have been proposing falters. For, after all is said and 
done, the Augustinian picture does not really allow for our achieving 
salvation as a function of our freely chosen growth and development. 
Furthermore, if one supposes that God possesses divine foreknowledge, 
then it seems reasonable to suppose that God, knowing that Albert the 
sinner will never make it to salvation on his own, may feel justified in 
nudging him along with a direct experience of the divine. Again, it 
lINIVERSALISM AND THE GREATER GOOD 101 
seems that the examples I have given of possible overriding purposes 
for the deity are rendered implausible. If, however, one adopts the view 
of God as epistemically open to the future, then God would never be in 
a situation such that God knows that Albert the sinner will not freely 
come to be saved. Given such a hypothesis, God may reasonably contin-
ue to try to get Albert to grow and develop by means of his free choices, 
rather than induce such a growth by means of some divine illumination. 
In any case, as long as it is logically possible for there to be a good that 
overrides God's will for universal salvation, it remains possible that all 
will not be saved. Perhaps Origen was wrong in believing that Satan 
would be saved. 
But, then again, perhaps Origen was right. For it is far from my intent 
here to deny that all will be saved. If I were to wager a bet, I would 
wager that all will be saved. Thus, there is a sense in which I agree with 
Talbott's universalism. However, unlike Talbott, I do not believe that 
universalism is a truth that follows from God's nature as a loving being 
who is able to save all and has the power to do so. For if we take liber-
tarian free will seriously, then the possibility that one or more persons 
will never achieve salvation must be allowed, however unlikely given 
God's overall aims. If my argument above is correct then God's desire 
for the greatest good may provide a good reason to limit the means he 
uses to produce salvation. However, given that God has at his disposal 
infinite time, and innumerable non-coercive means of nudging recalci-
trant sinners towards salvation, the likelihood that any would in the end 
not be saved strikes me as extremely slim.4 
This response to Talbott relies on a rejection of divine foreknowledge 
that Talbott (and others) may find unpalatable. Perhaps Talbott would 
argue that such a rejection itself involves a rejection of one of the claims 
of scripture. He might then conclude that it is much better to retain this 
doctrine than to reject the certainty of universal salvations. But this 
argument can be challenged on both scriptural and philosophical 
grounds. On scriptural grounds, it has been pointed out that while 
some passages of the Bible seem to support divine foreknowledge, oth-
ers imply a view of God that is open to the future. 6 Philosophically it 
has been argued, correctly in my view, that such an interpretation of 
omniscience logically precludes the existence of genuine creaturely free-
dom.7 Furthermore, the belief that God foreknows the future creates 
even more problems for the theist when she confronts the problem of 
evil. For on this view while the evil done by human beings may not be 
directly caused by God, it is nevertheless the case that God knew of and 
decided to permit evils such as the Holocaust prior to creation. Now 
perhaps God does have a reason for creating a world with a holocaust as 
opposed to one that does not contain such a great evil. The deductive 
argument from evil fairs no better with foreknowledge than without. 
However, given the prima facie implausibility of the claim that a world 
with the Holocaust is better than one without, the inductive argument 
from evil is much stronger when applied to a variety of theism that 
involves divine foreknowledge. 
These views are of course controversial. Let us then suppose that 
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God does possess foreknowledge. On this assumption God will have a 
reason for not including certain individuals in the world, namely, those 
that he foreknows would not be saved. In this way God can insure uni-
versal salvation without violating the free will of his creatures. Now if 
this picture were correct, then one particular good, the existence of free 
creatures, would not get in the way of universalism. However, this 
response on behalf of Talbott does not show that there are no goods such 
that God's desire to produce them provides God with sufficient reason 
to produce a person who God foreknows will not be saved. Thus, the 
logical point that the three propositions listed by Talbott are not incon-
sistent, remains. 
Furthermore, it does not follow from the fact that the salvation of any 
individual person is a great good that the universe only containing per-
sons who will be saved is the best universe. It may be, in other words, 
that while it is a great good for each person to be saved nevertheless a 
universe which contains also some individuals who are not saved is a 
better universe than one which contains only those individuals that will 
be saved. This is simply an application of G.E. Moore's principle of 
organic unities.' Thus for the world to be the best possible (or perhaps 
just better than some other alternative worlds) it may be that God would 
have to include beings who never will achieve salvation. Indeed on the 
orthodox view, non-human animals may be examples of such beings. 
Thus, even if we assume that God does possess foreknowledge, there is 
no reason for us to suppose that God must have arranged the world so 
that all will be saved. Again it may be the case that all will be saved. 
Given God's loving nature I believe we have good (but not logically con-
clusive) reason to believe that this is, in fact, the case. But this conclu-
sion cannot be logically inferred from the conjunction of Talbott's first 
two propositions. 
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NOTES 
1. Thomas Talbott, "Three Pictures of God," Faith and Philosophy 12 
(1995), p.79. 
2. Ibid. 
3. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 
1966). 
4. Indeed one difficulty of making a bet such as the one I suggested is 
that if one bets on the side of eternal separation from God, there is no time at 
which one may collect one's bet. For it does seem to me inconsistent with 
the goodness of God's will for God to put a timetable on salvation. 
5. This objection was suggested to me by William Wainwright. 
6. See Richard Rice "Biblical Support for a New Perspective," in 
Clark Pinnock, ed., The Openness of God (Downers Grove: Intervarsity 
Press, 1994), pp.ll-S8. 
7. The contemporary debate on this question can be traced to 
Nelson Pike's "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" in John Martin 
Fisher, ed., God foreknowledge and Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press: 1989). A more recent, and thorough defence of the incompatibility of 
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freedom and foreknowledge can be found in William Hasker's God,Time and 
Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
8. See Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1903), pp 28-30. The principle states that for any given whole, the 
value of that whole cannot accurately be determined by determining the 
sum of the value of its component parts. One cannot, to give Moore's exam-
ple, arrive at the correct value of whole which consists of a particular con-
sciousness of a beautiful object, by taking whatever value consciousness and 
the beautiful object have in isolation and adding them together. 
